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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has invested billions of dollars to 
prevent illegal drugs, immigration, weapons, and currency from transiting across the 
U.S.-Mexico border. DHS has not created a sufficient standardized method to measure 
whether an investment in a security measure is cost-effective when combining assets. To 
take it one step further, DHS has not created a model that combines cost-effectiveness of 
a security asset while simultaneously determining how it will contribute to achieving 
operational control of the border.  
This study provides an in-depth look into the current risk-based model DHS uses, 
the administrative and physical infrastructure of U.S.-Mexico border security, and a 
critical view of DHS’ annual budget. A decision model is presented that will give 
policymakers a process to choose a combination of border security investments that will 
achieve operational control of the border while remaining within budgeting constraints. A 
lot of work needs to be done for DHS to determine the correct security assets to be placed 
at the U.S.-Mexico Border to maintain operational control and cost-effectiveness. This 
study does not determine which security assets need to be put into place, but it provides a 
decision process that will be an asset for policymakers to save federal time and money 
assigned to border security investments. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the following question: How should the Department of 
Homeland Security build a model to evaluate impact and return-on-investment (ROI) on 
U.S.–Mexico border security expenditures? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The diversity of threats at the U.S.–Mexico border is highly complex and 
constantly evolving to defeat new technologies and other security resources placed at the 
border by policymakers. This is due to the economic incentives illegal markets offer for 
criminals who successfully transit the border. Threats include illegal migration, drugs, 
illegal weapons, and counterfeit products; policy makers have also been charged with 
preventing transnational terrorists and terrorist weapons from transiting across U.S. 
borders.1 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary federal agency 
tasked with defending the U.S.–Mexico border.  
To cope with resource limits, DHS currently relies on risk management models to 
determine border defense resource allocation.2 Economic theory dictates that these 
models best determine return on investment of border expenditures by including 
calculations of risk, success rates of attacks, and potential consequences of a defense 
expenditure. Using its current system of risk calculation, DHS has conducted risk 
assessments for a multitude of threats, but its existing documents do not analyze the 
opportunity costs of border security investments. This gap in assessment has resulted in 
conflicting border security priorities and has motivated Congress to request that DHS 
develop clear models that will assist in creating strategies to secure the border.3 
                                                 
1 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
2 Marc R. Rosenblum, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea, Border Security: Understanding 
Threats at U.S. Borders (CRS Report No. R42969) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013), 13, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731927. 
3 Ibid., 18. 
 2 
The security measures implemented at the U.S.–Mexico border have many 
peripheral effects on the environment, foreign relations, legal travel, culture, opportunity 
costs of other expenditures, among other things. The local communities near the U.S.–
Mexico border depend on cross-border traffic for economic and sociocultural ties and are 
vulnerable to changes in border security policy and technologies implemented.4 For 
example, border security implementations have led to decreased enrollment at 
universities near the border and dampened binational relationships due to the 
psychological divide these physical border security measures have created.5 The current 
method DHS uses to measure risk and the cost effectiveness of an investment does not 
calculate impact on any of these items.  
Every DHS border expenditure has an opportunity cost, defined as the value of an 
alternative investment lost when choosing to invest in an asset at the border. The illegal 
transiting of goods and personnel at the U.S.–Mexico border exists due to the demand of 
these products in the United States. The decision of the federal government to invest in 
border security to counteract threats creates an opportunity cost of alternate investments 
in social, economic, or other security programs that may have a greater impact on 
reducing illegal importation to the United States than current physical assets at the 
border. For example, additional investment in border walling creates an opportunity cost 
of additional funding in drug education programs that may reduce the demand for drugs 
in the United States. More personnel stationed at the border creates a potential 
opportunity cost of assigning additional personnel to conduct workplace enforcement on 
businesses that hire illegal immigrants, which may reduce the attractiveness of coming 
into the United States to find work. Modifications need to be made to any model that 
evaluates border security policies and fails to take into account opportunity costs of 
border security expenditures to provide policymakers with more complete information on 
the actual impact of a border security expenditure. 
                                                 
4 Jason Ackleson, “Border Security Technologies: Local and Regional Implications,” Review of Policy 
Research 22, no. 2 (2005): 138, doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2005.00126.x. 
5 Ibid. 
 3 
A decision model that lists security measures and their costs along with an 
effectiveness measure in achieving operational control of the U.S.–Mexico may allow 
policymakers in Congress and at DHS to determine the best way to prioritize the uses of 
resources, technologies and personnel at the border. This decision model will provide 
policymakers with a tool to make sound decisions going forward concerning the U.S.–
Mexico Border. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Current Demand of Decision Model for Border Defense  
The multitude of threats faced at the border make DHS’ border security 
management a challenge for policy making and planning.6 DHS in fiscal year 2017 has 
budgeted over $13.84 billion to secure and manage U.S. borders.7 In order to best 
allocate its resources, DHS measures the effectiveness of an investment based on risk 
management. The calculation of risk is important because it allows DHS to best 
determine the potential effects of mission failure at the border and quantifiably measure 
the benefit of a given investment.8 DHS can then use its method to compare between 
alternate investments and determine which will most efficiently complete its mission at 
the border.9  
An effective ROI approach for border security is important because there is a 
limited amount of resources to fund projects that address the multitude of threats at the 
border. The public’s awareness of the growing national debt contributes added pressure 
                                                 
6 Rosenblum, Bjelopera, and Finklea, Border Security: Understanding Threats, 18. 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 4–5, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017_BIB-MASTER.pdf. 
8 Henry H. Willis, Joel B. Predd, Paul K. Davis and Wayne Brown, Measuring the Effectiveness of 
Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 9, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR837.html.  
9 Ibid., 8. 
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to policymakers to implement efficient use of tax payer’s money in border defense 
expenditures.10 
2. Opportunity Cost of Homeland Security and Defense Spending 
Since the attacks on 9/11, “federal expenditures on domestic homeland security 
have increased by some $360 billion over those in place in 2001.”11 Global military 
expenditures total more than $1,739 billion per year, with the United States contributing 
to more than $700 billion of that amount.12 The large amounts of government spending 
directed at national and homeland security issues neglect economic and social 
development problems countries’ face.13 
The opportunity costs of homeland security spending have been dramatic. A study 
done by John Mueller and Mark Stewart quantified some of the many opportunity costs 
of homeland security spending. From 2001–2011, terrorism risk premiums, have cost $40 
billion, passenger delays from increased security during airport screenings have cost $100 
billion, increase in traffic fatalities for people avoiding airport delays have cost $32 
billion, and other deadweight losses have contributed to over $245 billion.14 Additional 
opportunity costs not quantified by their study but listed include cutbacks to education, 
healthcare, social security, tourism, property and stock market values, and expenditures 
on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.15 Specifically for border control, each year 
approximately $500 billion in goods enter and $200 billion in good exit the U.S. ports.16 
Imports and exports of these goods that are perishable items are severely affected by 
                                                 
10 LR Jones, “Return on Investment Analysis: Applying a Private Sector Approach to the Public 
Sector,” Prime Journal of Business Administration and Management 2, no. 1 (January 2012): 428, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40469. 
11 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security.” Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 16 (August 2011): 1, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/43. 
12 Colin Archer and Willi Annette, Opportunity Costs: Military Spending and the UN’s Development 
Agenda, Geneva, CH: International Peace Bureau, 2012, 14, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/getWSDoc.php?id=3260. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mueller and Stewart, “Balancing Costs of Homeland Security,” 2. 
15 Ibid. 
16 K. Jack Riley, Strategic Planning for Border Security, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014, 6, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT415/RAND_CT415.pdf. 
 5 
changes in cargo security and the costs companies incur to adjust to new control 
measures are included in opportunity costs.17 Restrictive measures on obtaining visas 
since 9/11 have affected tourism and legitimate workers coming to the United States, a 
negative effect on the U.S. economy.18 
The large amounts of funding allocated to military spending incurs opportunity 
costs on items that could benefit the environment and mankind. For the price of an 
“aircraft carrier ($5 billion), an area three times the size of Costa Rica could be reforested 
in the Amazon ($300 per hectare).”19 The expense of “one battle tank ($780,000), 26,000 
people could be treated for malaria ($30 per person).”20 Even if funding creates the 
world’s strongest army, that country will still be susceptible to social costs and climate 
change.21 
Border security threats are not stand-alone issues and have broader economic and 
social implications when security measures are put into place. Therefore, when proposing 
a border defense expenditure, policymakers must take into account opportunity costs of 
an investment.22 Terrorist Attack occur infrequently, and with the large amount of money 
spent on homeland security, the U.S. government is neglecting “the opportunity to spend 
those same resources on regulations and processes that can save more lives at the same 
cost, or even at a lower one.”23 The government must have a strong argument to spend 
large amounts of money on security measures that are hard to prove their worth while 
programs that are proven to save lives are neglected.24 Therefore, a model that takes into 
account opportunity costs will help policy makers in deciding what border controls will 
best benefit society.  
                                                 
17 Riley, Strategic Planning for Border Security, 6. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Colin Archer and Willi Annette, Opportunity Costs: Military Spending, 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Riley, Strategic Planning for Border Security, 5. 
23 Mueller and Stewart, “Balancing Costs of Homeland Security,” 15. 
24 Ibid. 
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3. Measuring ROI for DHS’ Border Security Expenditures 
Calculating ROI for DHS’ border security expenditures or any other public 
expenditure is more challenging compared to a more direct calculation approach that 
private companies take. In the private sector, ROI is a measure of the overall profit or 
loss of an investment, expressed in percentage.25 For a private business, ROI is a 
decision-making tool to evaluate not only the past or present value of an investment, but 
also to provide companies with insight into future decision-making.26 The private sector 
would calculate ROI, “by dividing a company’s net profit (also called net earnings) by 
the total investment (total debt plus equity), then multiplying by 100 to arrive at a 
percentage:”27 
 Net profit/total investment x 100 = ROI (1) 
The private sector has two primary methods for determining profitability: 
measuring Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).28 ROA is an important 
measurement because it allows a company to measure the effectiveness of the usages of 
its assets; the company can then compare ROA to other companies or with previous 
years.29 ROA is shown as a percentage by dividing net income by its total value of assets, 
and then multiplied by 100:30 
 Net profit/total assets x 100 = ROA (2) 
ROE is a measure of how well a business is using the money invested by outside 
shareholders to produce profit. This is an important measure that demonstrates how a 
effectively a company is using money invested in the company to produce earnings.31 
                                                 
25 Editors of Perseus Publishing, Business: The Ultimate Resource (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2002), 
837. 
26 Jones, “Return on Investment Analysis,” 426. 
27 Editors of Perseus Publishing, Business: The Ultimate Resource, 837. 
28 Jones, “Return on Investment Analysis,” 427. 
29 Editors of Perseus Publishing, Business: The Ultimate Resource, 836. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Editors of Perseus Publishing, Business: The Ultimate Resource, 836. 
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Return on equity is measured by dividing net income by shareholders’ equity and then 
multiplying by 100:32 
 Net income/shareholders’ equity x 100 = ROE (3) 
If a company wanted to calculate whether a future project would be worth the 
investment, calculating Internal Rate of Return (IRR) would assist in this effort. IRR lets 
a business know at what interest rate borrowing money at for an investment makes the 
project profitability based on expected cash flows.33 The company can compare the IRR 
to other projects that may be more profitable.34 
The ROI valuations in the private sector are not applicable to the public sector.35 
DHS does not expect income generated from its investments in border security. DHS is 
providing a public service and quantifying its ROI would be difficult in terms of dollars. 
One method of determining ROI for a public enterprise would be to compare its 
investments to the private sector; however, due to the uniqueness of DHS’ mission it is 
impossible to do this. A different metric to determine ROI for DHS is required.36  
The closest method to making an economic decision by DHS is the use of its risk 
model to determine the cost-effectiveness for a given border defense expenditure. The 
risk formula used by DHS is:37 
 R(terrorist attack) = p(Attempted Attack) x q(Success/Attempt) x [-
u(consequences)]                (4) 
R is measured as the risk of a terrorist attack, p is the probability of an attack, q is 
the probability that an attack is successful, and u is the utility function for consequences 
of a successful attack.38 The threat of an attempted attack is very difficult to measure, 
                                                 
32 Editors of Perseus Publishing, Business: The Ultimate Resource, 836. 
33 Ibid., 832. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jones, “Return on Investment Analysis,” 428. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ralph L Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt, “A Value Model for Evaluating Homeland Security 
Decisions,” Risk Analysis 31, no. 9 (2012): 1471, doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01597.x. 
38 Keeney and Winterfeldt, “A Value Model for Homeland Security,” 1471. 
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given the constantly changing threat environment and the abilities of criminals to adapt to 
new technologies.39 The probability that an attack if successful is measured by the 
likelihood that an adversary can defeat the current countermeasures and complete a 
successful attack.40 The consequences are the potential losses that can be faced given a 
successful attack.41 The assessment of p and q can be done using various risk analysis 
methods; the most appropriate one is still a debated topic among the risk analysis 
experts.42 The metrics for consequences are determined by developing a list of possible 
impacts of a successful attack on an element of border security. This measure is 
quantified in annual dollars by using sound judgement and empirical data when 
available.43  
The risk of a terrorist attack given a specific countermeasure that is put into place 
is measured as:44 
RC (Terrorist Attack with Countermeasure C) = pC(Attempted attack) x qC(Success of 
Attempt) x [-u(xC)]  (5) 
The benefit of the countermeasure would be determined by:45 
 B (countermeasure) = R(TA) – RC(TA) (6) 
The cost effectiveness can therefore be determined by taking the difference in the 
annual benefit of risk mitigation and dividing it by costs:46 
 Benefit/Cost = R(TA) – RC(TA)/Cost (7) 
Given that the inputs are accurate, this value model gives DHS an appropriate 
model for determining what assets to use for border security by determining which option 
                                                 
39 William L. McGill, Bilal M. Arrub, and Mark Kaminsky, “Risk Analysis for Critical Asset 
Protection,” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1266, doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2007.00955.x.  
40 McGill, Ayyub, and Kaminsky, “Risk Analysis,” 1269. 
41 Ibid., 1268–69. 
42 Keeney and Winterfeldt, “A Value Model for Homeland Security,” 1471. 
43 Ibid., 1474. 
44 Ibid., 1483. 
45 Keeney and Winterfeldt, “A Value Model for Homeland Security,” 1483. 
46 McGill, Ayyub, and Kaminsky, “Risk Analysis,” 1274. 
 9 
of security provides the greatest benefit relative to cost.47 Additional approaches to 
measuring border security expenditures and cost-effectiveness based on risk of attack has 
been attempted by other scholars. Scott Farrow developed a model to demonstrate how an 
expenditure used for one site will have positive impact on border controls at another.48 
His model is still limited to using only risk calculation in determining cost-effectiveness, 
ignoring externalities.  
4. Current ROI Model Deficiencies 
DHS policy-makers appear to seldom use its DHS risk model using cost-
effectiveness to determine resource allocation. This may be the case because proper 
metrics are hard to determine due to the constantly changing threat environment and little 
experience in valuing the actual consequences of threats.49 Therefore, empirical evidence 
cannot be relied upon solely in developing impact of a potential future event; causing this 
model to be valuable to only those who believe in its method. 
The size of the border and the fact that there are multiple agencies competing for 
limited resources further complicates evaluating ROI for a border defense expenditure.50 
When multiple agencies independently conduct their own measures of ROI and impact, it 
is possible that resources could be inappropriately pulled from each other or an enduring 
mission.51  
The goals of policymakers are not taken into account under the current cost-
effectiveness model. These opposed goals range from creating a “stronger” border, a 
“weaker” border, maintaining deterrence at the border while using alternate methods, or 
                                                 
47 Keeney and Winterfeldt, “A Value Model for Homeland Security,” 1485. 
48 Scott Farrow, “The Economics of Homeland Security Expenditures: Foundational Expected Cost-
Effectiveness Approaches,” Contemporary Economic Policy 25, no. 1 (January 2007): 19, doi: 
10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006.00029.x. 
49 Ibid., 14. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Willis et. al, Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security, 4. 
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taking purely a cost-effective approach.52 The cost-effectiveness of a border security 
expenditure also ignores opportunity costs of investments that may provide impact on 
threats transiting the border. Studies suggest that decision makers largely ignore the value 
of opportunity costs or do not value them highly enough. This is due to incomplete 
information on an opportunity costs’ value and that the nature of a policymaker is to be 
risk averse, therefore policymakers will not give appropriate proper value to alternative 
investments without complete information.53 
5. ROI in the Public Sector 
Various return-on-investment models have been completed to assist policymakers 
in determining the value of government programs. In 1991, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) conducted an ROI study on the value of its management curriculum. 
It is a five-day course that is meant to increase productivity of the personnel who attend 
it.54 The ROI formula OPM used:55 
 ROI = (Net Program Benefits/Program Costs) x 100 (8) 
The program benefits were an estimation of skills gained by the training and the 
costs included the total costs associated with the course, including salaries, tuitions, and 
other associated expenses. The overall ROI was calculated to be 150 percent.56 
The RAND corporation conducted a study to evaluate ROI for the U.S. Navy 
funding graduate education programs for its officers. The model used inputs for the costs 
of providing the education along with the benefits of the increased utility the officer 
                                                 
52 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Walls, Sensors and Drones: Technology and Surveillance on the US-
Mexico Border” in Borders, Fences, Walls: State of Insecurity? ed. Elisabeth Vallet (New York: Routledge, 
2016), 208. 
53 Robert E. Hoskin, “Opportunity Cost and Behavior,” Journal of Accounting Research 21, no. 1 
(Spring 1983): 78–79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2490937.pdf. 
54 Todd L. Chmielewski and Jack J. Phillips, “Measuring Return-on-Investment in Government: Issues 
and Procedures,” Public Personnel Management 31, no. 2 (2002): 233, doi: 
10.1177/009102600203100208. 
55 Ibid., 231. 
56 Chmielewski and Philips, “Measuring Return-on-Investment in Government,” 233. 
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would provide to the Navy as a result of the graduate education.57 The result of the study 
provided the amount of years an officer would need to serve in a billet coded for that 
education requirement to break-even on the Navy’s investment. The amount of years 
needed for repayment varied by job type.58 
The U.S. Navy Dental Corps created a model for evaluating ROI for each branch 
location using the following formula:59 
 ROI = (DWV x 100) - [(APF x Milab) x 0.25] / [(APF + Milab) x 0.25] (9) 
The Dental Weighted Value (DWV) is the dental procedural value of services 
added converted into 100 dollars of services. The investment in funding (APF) and 
military labor (Milab) are the annualized amounts provided to a branch converted to a 
quarterly amount.60 This formula has since been modified to include items such as 
equipment depreciation and bonuses provided to dentists to continue service.61 The U.S. 
Dental Corps uses this model to compare the efficiency that each branch location is 
operating at and allows policymakers to adjust resource allocation to ensure maximum 
efficiency. 
From 1999 to 2002, the United States Postal Service (USPS) used a model call 
Economic Value Added (EVA) to determine ROI.62 This model evaluates the net cash 
flow of an investment by calculating the value added of an investment and subtracting the 
costs to produce that income.63 The USPS would offer bonuses to employees that 
produced high value income based on programs implemented. This program was 
discontinued in 2002 because USPS was paying out bonuses that resulted in a net loss for 
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the company.64 Conventional private business ROI processes previously discussed have 
since been implemented in USPS. The USPS is different from most other government 
agencies because it operates more like a private business and generate income from their 
services.65 
The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) created an ROI models to evaluate the 
ROI of bonuses distributed to retain their marine engineers (MEs).66 An approach RNZN 
took included questionnaires that were completed by personnel who were retained 
because of the bonus. The estimated retention impact (represented by F in Equation 10) 
was calculated by multiplying the 41% of personnel stated they remained in service 
because of the bonus and 93% stated they were confident that this was the reasoning.67 
The costs of an engineer leaving service (B) and training a new engineer (C) multiplied 
by the personnel retained (A) were the benefit inputs to the model. The cost input was the 
value of the bonuses paid (H). The following formula was used:68 
 ROI = ([(B + C) x A x F] - H) / H (10) 
This method determined a 43% return on investment for the ME bonus. The 
RNZN used another model based more on empirical data instead of survey results that 
produced similar results.69 
6. Game Theory and Social Sciences 
In building a model that reflects social change you must begin with situation that 
is mathematically based and has logical consequences.70 Game theory is a mathematical 
model that analyzes possible interactions among people for given situations. The people 
are defined as actors. A model can be created with a finite or infinite number of actors. 
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An example of actors in a security situation would be security forces as one group and 
adversaries as another.71 Milind Tambe uses a special class of games called the Bayesian-
Stackelberg Games to help determine asset allocation for security problems. A simplified 
version of this is demonstrated with two actors: adversary and defenders.72 The adversary 
could attack two different terminals at an airport and the defenders have a limited amount 
of resources to defend their assets. The goal for each party is to determine an action that 
will maximize their utility, or payoff. The amount utility gained by attacking or 
defending either terminal is determined by experts in the field.73 There are underlying 
assumptions into this model, such as each party has perfect knowledge of the other.74 
The goal Tambe has in this type of approach to security game is to find what 
allocation of resources will benefit the defenders the most, labelled the strong 
Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE).75 This model can be further complicated to incorporate 
multiple actors and adversary types. Tambe applied this method to three real-world 
applications used today. She developed the ARMOR system at Los Angeles International 
Airport (LAX), which helps the airport determine when and where to set up vehicle 
checkpoints; the IRIS system for the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) to randomize 
assignment of agents on flights to counteract surveillance; and GUARDS system to help 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to allocate resources to different 
airports.76 
Many uses of game theory do exist and have been researched in depth on their 
effects on public policy. Aumann and Kurz developed a model that uses game theory 
foundations of the Harsanyi–Shapley–Nash value for non-transferable utility games, to 
develop a process to determine, “where the power of each individual is reflected both in 
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the political and economic spheres.”77 This is a dynamic model incorporating purely an 
economic output. Dynamic models are most beneficial to be used when determining 
human affairs because it allow for an infinite number of outcomes and time span, 
allowing for more flexibility to changes in laws, institutions, and other factors.78 
A dynamic model rooted in game theory was developed by Lewis Richardson to 
determine arms races among nations.79 The purpose of his model was to determine 
armament behavior by individual nations based on the economic burden of the military, 
perceived threat of other nations building up their arms, and the effects of internal politics 
regarding arms building.80 This model is applicable if assumed that the actions of one 
nation effect another nation’s decision to increase its arms. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 gave the authority to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security the right to enforce all actions to achieve complete operational control of the 
border, defined as prevention of all unlawful entries to the border.81 This goal is 
unreasonable due to limited resources allocated to border defense expenditures, forcing 
DHS to assess tradeoffs in determining how to effectively secure the border.  
For singular investments, it is possible to apply the current model to any potential 
border defense measure to determine whether an investment is cost-effective. For 
example, if policymakers want to eliminate drug trafficking in a particular stretch of the 
border, given the inputs are good, they can make a reasonable decision on the best 
investment to eliminate it by comparing investment opportunities and choosing the one 
that results in the lowest total threat. However, the lowest total threat decision will not 
always be the most cost-effective. 
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The risk based model will only determine cost-effectiveness of an investment, 
based on reducing the likelihood of an attack. This model does not assess cost-
effectiveness in achieving operational control of the border. A model that includes these 
effects would allow policymakers to evaluate the complete impact of a border security 
expenditure. This new model will assist policymakers in making sound decisions when 
deciding upon how to allocate funding that is meant to reduce or eliminate threats faced 
at the border. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
The current ROI model that DHS employs falls short of accounting for the effect 
of combining assets and does not acknowledge that policy can affect operational control 
of the border. In this thesis, I attempt to create a new model that will be a tool for 
policymakers to use when deciding on future border security expenditures. 
This thesis examines the administrative infrastructure charged with protecting the 
U.S.–Mexico border. This examination provides context for a review of technological 
and other physical assets placed at the border. This thesis examines current border 
security measures in place at the U.S.–Mexico border and publicly available enforcement 
data. The current security measures are outlined in detail to create an understanding of 
how taxpayer money is spent to support my argument that spending is done with little 
thought to cost-effectiveness and achieving operational control of the border. The 
decision model proposed for border security expenditures is then outlined in detail with 
justification for each input.  
The goal of this thesis is to create a new decision model that is a tool for 
policymakers to achieve operational control U.S.–Mexico border, understand what this 
total cost is, and present the level of operational control possible under the current 
budgeting level. A new model that calculates effectiveness of a specific security measure 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. The restructuring of the decision process for 
determining assets at the border will be the output of the model created. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF U.S.–MEXICO BORDER SECURITY LEGAL 
AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Defending the U.S.–Mexico border against a multitude of threats is a constantly 
evolving process for the United States. Prior to the Cold War, the United States had, 
“secure borders, large oceans as moats, and an offensive capability abroad, the United 
States could shield the homeland. That era is over.”82 The 1990s saw an increase in 
illegal immigration and drug trade transiting the U.S.–Mexico border, as well as an 
increase in terrorist actions within U.S. borders. Terrorist attacks include the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1996 Centennial Olympic 
Park bombing. The terrorist attack on 9/11 demonstrated the need for reorganization to 
better defend the U.S. homeland. The federal government shifted focus from threats 
abroad to threats transiting our borders and initiated the, “most extensive government 
reorganization in the past 50 years in creating the Department of Homeland Security.”83 
The purpose of this chapter is to create an understanding on how complicated 
U.S.–Mexico border security is and how expenditures have evolved to become a massive 
economic consideration. The physical infrastructure of the U.S.–Mexico border has 
continually evolved to support the legal framework established to control flow of goods 
and people at the border. The laws put in place to control flow have evolved to mitigate 
perceived threats at the U.S.–Mexico border.  
This chapter will examine the physical infrastructure evolution of the U.S.–
Mexico border along with the different government agencies tasked with controlling the 
flow of goods and people and mitigating the risk of illegal flow of traffic. This 
exploration of the agencies involved and their tasks will demonstrate the complexity of 
border security budgeting. 
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B. U.S.–MEXICO BORDER 
The U.S.–Mexico border spans 1,989 miles in length. Annually, “more than 500 
million people cross the borders into the United States, some 330 million of whom are non-
citizens.”84 The heavily trafficked borders leave DHS to deal with threats “ranging from 
terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to transnational criminals 
smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work 
in the United States.”85 The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is the federal entity that 
is given the majority of resources for border security. Proper border protection is however, 
a complicated joint effort among multiple federal, state, and local agencies. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT DAY BORDER SECURITY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Prior to the 20th century, the United States did not have any formal border 
protection on the border, and then, “in 1904, Teddy Roosevelt created the United States 
Immigration Service, which consisted of 75 men on horseback, based in El Paso, Texas, 
responsible for the patrol of the entire 2,300-mile southwest border.”86 The Emergency 
Quota Act of 1921 limited immigration to the United States to 3 percent of each 
nationality present in the United States, based on the 1910 census.87 The immigration 
limit outlined in the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 created a, “dramatic increase in 
illegal immigration, which led to the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924.”88 The 
U.S. Border Patrol at that time was a part of the Department of Labor and was created, 
“to prevent illegal migration across our southern border with Mexico and our northern 
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border with Canada.”89 The U.S. Border Patrol remained a part of the Department of 
Labor until the formation of DHS in 2003. 
Following the attacks of 9/11, immigration reform and border enforcement has 
become a primary mission set of the United States; however, to say that 9/11 completely 
changed border enforcement would be inaccurate.90 The current day enforcement of the 
borders is a product of the Chinese Exclusion Acts from the post-civil war era. The 
Supreme Court reviewed the Chinese Exclusion Acts and concluded “that the power to 
regulate immigration should be an unequivocally federal mandate and that it could not be 
subject to constitutional or judicial oversight.”91 This landmark decision by the Supreme 
Court has since made it an understanding that the Legislative Branch holds the power to 
immigration control. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, along with its 
amendments in the 1990s, further strengthened Congress’ grasp on immigration 
regulation, separating it further from formal judicial review.92 An important detail of the 
immigration reform in the 1990s came when Congress expanded the list of what is 
considered an aggravated felony. Aggravated felonies are crimes that automatically lead 
to deportation of illegal immigrants.93 Prior to the 1990s, an aggravated felony included 
only murder, firearms and weapons trafficking; until this list was expanded to include 
misdemeanors and other minor offenses.94 This led to deportations rising dramatically 
throughout the 1990s. The primary perceived threat during this time was the loss of U.S. 
jobs. This changed post-9/11, where immigration reform and enforcement at the borders 
has been done primarily in the name of national security.95 
The turmoil of the 1990s and the vulnerabilities exposed to the homeland from the 
attacks on 9/11; forced the federal government to refocus its defense efforts on the home 
                                                 
89 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Security in the 21st Century.” 
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front. In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act and, “the 
Department of Homeland Security formally came into being as a stand-alone, Cabinet-
level department to further coordinate and unify national homeland security efforts, 
opening its doors on March 1, 2003.”96 The formation of DHS integrated 22 federal 
agencies into one department, including the U.S. Border Patrol, now formally named U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol. The purpose of DHS was to create a, “strengthened 
homeland security enterprise and a more secure America that is better equipped to 
confront the range of threats we face.”97 
D. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) 
CPB’s establishment in 2003 marked the future of border protection in the United 
States. CPB “is itself one of the largest agencies of our government, with a budget of $3.5 
billion, a total of 23,000 personnel, 20,833 border patrol agents and the largest-ever level 
of technology and equipment.”98 The primary purpose of CBP, “is to prevent the entry of 
terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United States.”99 CBP has other areas 
of focus besides terrorism including, “the responsibility to prevent illegal immigration; 
regulate and facilitate international trade; collect import duties; enforce U.S. trade and 
drug laws; and protect Americans and U.S. agriculture and economic interests by 
preventing the importation of harmful pests, diseases, and contaminated, diseased, 
infested, or adultered agriculture and food products.”100 CBP has a complicated and 
varied mission set. CBP executes its mission by conducting inspections at the border 
while it, “enforce[s] more than 400 laws and regulations at the border.”101 
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The complexities faced by our CBP agents on a daily basis led to the organization 
of its own intelligence personnel. The CBP in October 2007, “reorganized its intelligence 
and anti-terrorism functions by establishing the OIOC [Office of Intelligence and 
Operations Coordination] headed by an Assistant Commissioner.”102 This office, “does 
not engage in traditional foreign intelligence activities,” but it does coordinate with the 
intelligence community (IC) to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.103 The 
headquarters for the OIOC is the Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC) in El Paso, 
Texas. Established in 2004, BORFIC, “conducts all intelligence activities to support the 
border security mission of the BP [Border Patrol] and other DHS and CBP elements.”104 
BORFIC, “exchanges intelligence and law enforcement information with numerous 
federal, state, local, and tribal organization agencies and actively participates in several 
interagency and bilateral groups.”105 
1. Office of Air and Marine (OAM) 
The CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) provides maritime and aerial support 
for CBP’s border security mission. Its force asset stands at “approximately 1,660 federal 
employees, 240 aircraft and 400 marine vessels.”106 OAM aircraft consist of manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles that extend the range of Border Patrol agents’ ability to detect 
illegal border crossings. Its marine vessels navigate waterways that would otherwise be 
not be surveilled. OAM is essential to border protection and have achieved highly 
successful enforcement numbers. In FY 2015, CBP’s Air and Marine Operations 
“resulted in the seizure or disruption of 230,579 pounds of cocaine; 719,549 pounds of 
marijuana; 1,427 weapons and $49.3 million; 4,485 arrests and 51,130 apprehensions.”107 
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E. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) 
Established in 2003 as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ICE is 
another important element of border protection along the U.S.–Mexico border. ICE “was 
incorporated into DHS by consolidating the investigative elements of the former U.S. 
Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and by transferring 
the Federal Protective Service from the General Services Administration (GSA).”108 The 
primary mission of ICE is to “enforce trade and immigration laws through investigative 
activities, persons, and events that may pose a threat to the safety or security of the 
United States and its people.”109 ICE investigates include human trafficking, WMD, and 
smuggling of drugs and other illegal goods. Its ability to work with the CBP in protecting 
the U.S. border takes a collaborative effort. 
Just as CBP developed an intelligence entity, the Office of Intelligence and 
Operations Coordination, ICE needed an intelligence cell of its own. ICE developed the 
Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) in 2008, which is located in the El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC).110 BVIC provides intelligence support for ICE to counter 
threats specifically on the U.S.–Mexico border. Due to increases in threats transiting the 
southern border, ICE partnered with the Mexican government to increase border security, 
coordinated out of BVIC.111 The results of this partnership were the development of the 
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST), Armas Cruzadas, and Operational 
Firewall.112 
BEST is a multi-agency task force that partners with the DEA, FBI, ATF, and the 
Mexican law enforcement agency Secretaria de Seguridad Public to combat crime on the 
U.S.-Mexico border. Armas Cruzadas is a partnership between the U.S. and Mexican law 
enforcement agencies whose, “objective is to synchronize bilateral law enforcement and 
intelligence sharing operations in order to identify, disrupt, and dismantle trans-border 
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weapons smuggling networks.”113“Operational Firewall is a joint effort with the CBP to 
target the full array of methods used to smuggle bulk cash,” across the border.114 The 
three bilateral agreements with Mexico demonstrates the Mexican government desire to 
reduce crime not only transiting the border, but among its own borders. 
ICE’s collaborative efforts to fight crime, cash, and weapons from transiting the 
border does not address the threat of illegal immigration. The development of the Human 
Smuggling and Traffic Center (HSTC) was ICE’s way of addressing illegal immigration. 
The HSTC was established by the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 and, “serves as the U.S. Government’s intelligence fusion center and information 
clearinghouse for all federal agencies addressing human smuggling, human trafficking, 
and the facilitation of terrorist mobility.”115 ICE is a major contributor to HSTC, but the 
center also brings together, “federal agency representatives from the policy, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic areas to work together on a full-time basis to 
convert intelligence into effective law enforcement and diplomatic action.”116 
ICE is an investigative unit within DHS that works with multiple different 
agencies to combat crime transiting the U.S.–Mexico border. The development of BVIC 
and the bilateral agreements with Mexico allow them to be an effective federal agency 
when it comes to border defense.  
F. DHS OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A) 
In 2005, DHS went through a restructuring and created the DHS I&A office. DHS 
I&A “manages its intelligence and information sharing responsibilities.”117 The I&A was 
the main focal point of communication between the IC and DHS. The I&A does not 
partake in foreign intelligence collection; as other members of the IC do. The I&A 
completes all parts of the intel process for homeland security; including collection, 
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analysis, and dissemination of products to various customers.118 Customers of the I&A 
vary from the President, all the way down to the border patrol agents. 
All of the I&A primary missions could pertain to border security. The five 
missions that the I&A focuses on is, “border security, including narcotics smuggling, 
alien and human smuggling, and money laundering; radicalization and extremism; 
particular groups entering the United States that could be exploited by terrorists or 
criminals; critical infrastructure and key resources; and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and health threats.”119 To have success in these missions, coordination is 
mandatory among federal, state, and local entities. 
The I&A is responsible for multiple intelligence products that are used in border 
defense. The Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HSTA) “is an annual threat 
assessment that represents the analytical judgments of DHS and assesses the major 
threats to the homeland for which the nation must prepare and respond.”120 I&A provide 
more urgent warnings with the Intelligence Warning and Intelligence Note. The 
Homeland Security Monitors address border security interests directly. I&A also releases 
bulletins that are in conjunction with the FBI in the Joint Homeland Security 
Assessment/FBI Intelligence Bulletin.121 They regularly publish Homeland Intelligence 
Reports (HIR), which “contains information that has yet to be evaluated.”122 The reports 
generated out of the I&A are used by multiple federal, state, and local agencies and they 
are typically unclassified or labeled, “For Official Use Only.”123 
The I&A established the Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP) and its 
purpose is to, “enhance its support of border security activities.”124 The IBIP created the 
Homeland Intelligence Support Team stationed in El Paso, TX. The mission of I&A 
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intelligence officers is to “coordinate and facilitate the delivery of national intelligence 
and enhance information infusion to support DHS operational missions at the border.”125 
The increased participation at the border by the I&A has led to the increased production 
of HIRs that utilized by multiple agencies to assist in border protection. 
G. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND BORDER DEFENSE 
The Intelligence Community (IC) in the United States is a separate entity then 
what has been developed within DHS. The term IC refers to agencies such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), among others. Most IC contributions to border security are 
classified. It is “not possible based on unclassified materials to provide a metric for the 
value of intelligence information on border security efforts.”126 The undefined element of 
the IC’s contribution to border security is when and where does the IC get involved? The 
IC has jurisdictional limits when it comes to collecting on U.S. citizens, which makes it 
difficult to clearly define the role of the IC in protecting our borders. 
The relationship between DHS and the IC must be effective in order to properly 
protect the U.S.–Mexico border. The role of DHS with the IC is to, “serve as a bridge 
between federal intelligence agencies of all sorts and the first responders, helping 
translate national intelligence down to the first responders and helping pass along detailed 
local knowledge from first responders to intelligence agencies.”127 The IC can benefit 
DHS with providing valid information that will help allocate resources. DHS has limited 
resources and incorporates risk-based uses of those resources. Without contribution from 
the IC, “DHS will never have the resources to defend America. This is not only an 
operational imperative but a budgetary one: intelligence enables homeland defenders to 
use limited resources effectively and save taxpayer dollars.”128 DHS needs “focus 
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sharpened by intelligence. For example, the Department of Homeland Security must 
know where to increase border patrols and where to concentrate customs investigations to 
defeat strategic threats in the form of microtargets.”129 
The IC can provide information to DHS that will help reduce reaction times to 
foreign threats transiting the U.S.–Mexico border. The intelligence community can help 
combat, “foreign threats through accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence, enabling 
homeland consumers of intelligence to respond with precision and speed.”130 The IC is 
helping DHS by increasing efficiency in resource allocation and reduced reaction times is 
helping find solutions to threats faced on the border. 
The IC’s contribution to fighting the threats on the border is complicated but 
useful. In some instances, the threats United States faces, may be outside the focus of a 
collecting IC, when to get involved has been an undefined measure that is crucial to 
creating effective border defenses. When it comes to border security issues they, “often 
involve U.S. persons as well as foreign nationals and the U.S.–Mexico and U.S.–Canada 
borders are surrounded by individual families with ties to both countries.”131 The war on, 
“narcotics crosses the line established in the United States between foreign and domestic 
intelligence and between intelligence and law enforcement. The point at which an issue is 
handed from one agency to another is not always clear but it is important, raising both 
practical and legal questions.”132 President Obama attempted to clarify the IC 
communities’ involvement in the war on Drugs by publishing the National Southwest 
Border Narcotics Strategy in June 2009, which directly states that the IC will be involved 
in battling illegal narcotics smuggling.133 
Illegal immigration along the U.S.–Mexico border is a threat that is of high 
concern to the country but may not be the focus of the IC. The IC will focus on 
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immigration when “illegal immigrants include terrorists, drug smugglers, or foreign 
agents or reflect significant levels of organized human trafficking.”134 When immigrants 
are not threats to national security the IC’s provides limited contribution to countering 
those threats. 
Fusion centers have been an attempt at better collaborative efforts among federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies and the IC.135 The Department of Justice 
established the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) in 1974 and has grown to include over 
20 federal agencies. EPIC’s purpose is to gather and share information focused on 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism.136 The NGA, DHS, Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA), Coast Guard, and FBI all provide intelligence inputs to the EPIC workforce.137 
Joint Task Force North in El Paso, TX is a DOD led fusion center developed to help 
coordinate among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against the fight on 
the illegal flow of drugs across the Southwest Border.138 
The U.S. IC has a complicated involvement in Border Security, but many assets 
available to counter the threats faced along the U.S.–Mexico border. Timely, accurate 
information shared with federal, local, and state law enforcement and can help reduce the 
amount of personnel and goods transit the U.S.–Mexico Border. The exact role of the 
intelligence community in border security has not been defined. There is effort from the 
Federal Government to improve the contributions of the IC, but there is still more to do. 
Due to jurisdictional restraints, the contributions of the IC to border patrol is also 
restricted. Protecting civil liberties of U.S. citizens is an important recognition of policy 
makers; however, if information collected by the IC inadvertently violates civil liberties 
but can prevent a threat from transiting the border, that information should still be shared 
and acted upon by federal, state, or local law enforcement. 
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H. STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The Constitution governs that immigration is enforceable by the federal 
government because it is a matter that affects all states.139 The relationship between federal 
agencies and local law enforcement comes through formal means such as fusion centers and 
BEST. The informal relationship occurs during day-to-day routine law enforcement 
operations.140 State and local law enforcement cannot by themselves enforce immigration 
laws and must do it under the purview of federal agencies. State and local law enforcement 
“assistance must be rendered within any parameters set by DHS so that DHS can exercise 
control over enforcement.”141 This is to assure that state and local law enforcement do not 
violate the provisions under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.  
I. TECHNOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL BORDER SECURITY 
INVESTMENT 
Investment in technological and physical border security by DHS has dramatically 
increased since the beginning of the 21st century. The “significant border-wide 
investments in additional enforcement resources and enhanced operational tactics and 
strategy have enabled CBP to address the changing composition of attempted border 
crossers to maintain border security.”142 The increase in Border Patrol agents along the 
southwest border has increased from 8,619 in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to 18,127 in FY 
2014.143 This increase in manpower has directly contributed to less attempted crossings. 
Arrests or apprehension due to illegal border crossing attempts in FY 2000 were over 1 
million, and that number today has been reduced to approximately 400,000 a year.144  
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Primary fencing along the U.S.–Mexico border in FY 2000 was 57.9 miles, and 
that number has been increased to 352.7 miles today. Secondary fencing during this time 
period has increased from 10 miles to 36.3 miles today. Vehicle fencing in FY 2000 was 
only 10 miles and that has been increased to 299 miles today.145 The United States now 
has over 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.–Mexico border. Border lighting increased 
from 17 miles in FY 2000 to 70 miles today.146 Border fencing and proper lighting is an 
effective physical deterrent to personnel attempting to cross the border. Personnel may 
have the means to climb a fence, but the process slows their crossing and makes it 
difficult to transport goods and other heavy equipment over it.  
Technological investment to increase surveillance has assisted DHS in the 
improved physical security of the U.S.–Mexico border. In FY 2000, there were no 
underground sensors at the border, that number has increased to 11,863 devices.147 Two 
years ago, “CBP completed the restoration of eight Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems 
(TARS). TARS, a network of long-range radars, is the only wide-area persistent air, 
maritime, and land surveillance capability specifically designed for CBP’s border 
security mission.”148 This long-range radar “detects … approximately 200 miles out, well 
beyond the physical border, thereby significantly increasing domain awareness and the 
time with which to plan and make decision.”149 
CBP has also increased investment in air assets pertaining to border defense. The 
CBP now has over 107 aircraft compared to 56 in FY 2000.150 President Obama “has 
agreed to support Mexican counternarcotics efforts with the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) over the shared border.”151 Today, the CBP has 8 UAVs compared to 
none in FY 2000.152 There are currently two UAVs equipped with the Vehicle and 
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Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) that is “a side-looking airborne radar system 
designed to detect, identify, and classify moving tracks of interest over land.”153 VADER 
accounted for 7,616 detections of illegal activity in FY 2014.154 
Since FY 2000, increased investment in CBP and the DHS as a whole in physical 
and technological advances have had an impressive contribution to enforcement at the 
U.S.-Mexico border. In FY 2015, CBP had a total of 331,335 apprehensions; 2,137,428 
pounds of drug seizures; $19,990,371 of currency seizures; and 113, 573 persons 
determined to be inadmissible.155 The CBP would not be able to have success without the 
increased assets at the border. This number is impressive, but it is not due to physical 
border assets in its entirety. Intelligence and coordination with state and local law 
enforcement is a major portion of border protection that contributes to this enforcement 
data. The next chapter will cover statistics of border patrol enforcement more in depth. 
J. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the primary federal agencies in DHS tasked with 
maintaining operational control of the U.S.–Mexico border and the relationship DHS has 
with the IC, State, and Local law enforcement pertaining to border security. The complex 
relationships demonstrate the complexities of the budgeting process for DHS. DHS 
spending is not done autonomously. When combatting threats at the border, DHS must 
incorporate the costs of not only their own agencies, but the costs of cooperating with 
others. The next chapter will examine the budgetary spending dedicated to border 
security as well as enforcement numbers. Figuring out what DHS has achieved with its 
funding is an important step in measuring impact and return-on-investment of its border 
security expenditures. Border security is a complicated multi-scalar endeavor that 
requires DHS to be creative and flexible in its budgeting process. 
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III. U.S.–MEXICO BORDER BUDGETING AND ENFORCEMENT 
DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the creation of DHS, the federal government has steadily increased the 
amount of resources dedicated to protecting the U.S.–Mexico Border. The increase in 
awareness of vulnerabilities to the homeland and the perceived threat of illegal goods and 
personnel transiting the border is what has driven the increased investment. Interest in 
protecting the U.S.–Mexico border is directly reflected in the increase in border security 
expenditures following 9/11. This chapter is an examination of DHS’ budget, in 
particular an examination of CBP’s significant border security investments along the 
U.S.–Mexico border. The previous chapter included a broad discussion of border security 
infrastructure, but this chapter will closely examine resources dedicated to protecting the 
U.S.–Mexico border. 
All security organizations are attempting to keep the asset they are protecting 
safe. DHS’ spending on the Southwest Border focuses on preventing illegal goods and 
personnel from entering the United States. Its success is currently published through 
enforcement data. An examination of the published enforcement data concurrently with a 
critical view of the budget will help establish whether the massive investment of 
resources along the Southwest border has been worth it. The chapter will set the stage for 
a model concerning return-on-investment for border security expenditures. 
B. DHS BUDGETING AND INVESTMENTS 
The initial investment in DHS was considerable even for the federal government’s 
standards. In 2001, President Bush released a budget justification titled Securing the 
Homeland Strengthening the Nation, which established the justification for massive 
investments on homeland defense spending. He described the border as a “massive flow of 
people and goods across our borders help drive our economy but can also serve as a conduit 
for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrants, contraband, and other unlawful 
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commodities.”156 The president defined the first border management priority as the 
prevention of international terrorists from entering. The other illegal threats posed at the 
border, such as drugs or illegal immigration, were listed by President Bush as secondary 
considerations to terrorism.157 The president requested a 2.2 billion dollar raise for border 
security expenditures for 2003 and the spending continued to increase ever since. 
Presented in Figure 1 is the budget for DHS from its inception in 2002 to 2016. 
The budget each year for DHS has grown considerably. Each year spending has increased 
over the year prior except in two instances, enacted budget from FY 2010 to 2011 and 
from FY 2012 to 2013. The initial DHS budget was $23.3 billion and reached its peak in 
FY 2016 at $53.2 billion. Where is all this money going? What portion is specifically 
dedicated to border security?  
 
Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget. 
Figure 1.  DHS Enacted Gross Budget (in $Billions).158 
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Examining the DHS budget alone is too large of a scale when considering 
specifically border security investment impact and return-on-investment. It is also not 
necessary because they invest in so many assets not related to border security. It is 
appropriate to mention; however, because it is demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
border security is a collaborative effort within DHS. CBP is the main federal agency 
charged with protecting the homeland, and under it is the U.S. Border Patrol and CBP’s 
Office of Air and Marine Operations. ICE and DHS Intelligence and Analysis are worth 
mentioning because of their contributions to border security. 
1. CBP 
The CBP experienced the same trend in budgeting as the overall DHS budget. Its 
budget increased each year except for the dips in FY 2010 to 2011 and FY 2012 to 2013. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this data. At its creation, CBP had an initial budget of $5.8 billion. 
This number has more than doubled to the 2016 enacted budget to $13.2 billion. 
 
Figure 2.  CBP Enacted Budget (in $Billions).159 
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(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003–2016), https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget#. 
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CBP’s mission does not solely lie at the physical U.S. borders, the maritime 
borders and customs from shipping also lay under its purview. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to use its total budget when developing an understanding of border security 
expenditures. To get an idea of money allocated to border security, we must take a closer 
look at the CBP’s budget.  
Significant investments have been made at and between points of entry by the 
CBP to enhance border security. As shown in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6, CBP’s investment 
along U.S. borders has increased in every category delineated on its annual budgets 
except for its investment in Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology. 
 
Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget.  
Figure 3.  CBP Border Security Control Between POEs (in $Billions) Enacted 
Budget.160 
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Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget. 
Figure 4.  CBP Border Inspection Facilities at POEs (in $Billions) Enacted 
Budget.161 
 
Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget. Data not 
presented in budget until FY 2007. 
Figure 5.  CBP Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Enacted 
Budget.162 
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Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget. Data not 
presented in budget until FY 2005. 
Figure 6.  CBP Air and Marine Interdiction Enacted Budget.163 
The U.S. Border Patrol is worth mentioning as a separate category from CBP 
concerning border security. Following the creation of DHS, the U.S. Border Patrol has 
received an incredible increase in the amount of resources allocated in money and 
personnel, represented in Figures 7 and 8.  
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(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003–2016), https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget#. 
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Figure 7.  USBP Budget (in $Billions).164 
 
Figure 8.  USBP Southwest Border Staffing.165  
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The data presented has demonstrated an overall upward trend in investment in 
border security. The majority of resources are dedicated to the Southwest border because 
of the perceived threat of criminal activity transiting the border.  
2. ICE and DHS I&A 
The previous chapter demonstrated the joint-effort between multiple DHS 
agencies that contribute to border security. While ICE and DHS I&A primary duties are 
not border enforcement, both play an important role in limiting the illegal activity 
transiting the border. Their budgets are presented in Figures 9 and 10. ICE, like CBP, has 
experienced an overall upward trend in investment dollars. Its initial enacted budget for 
FY 2003 was $3.2 billion and they have over doubled its budget through the years to over 
$6.1 billion in 2016. The DHS Intelligence and Analysis budget is allocated under the 
Analysis and Operations office of DHS. Its budget peaked in 2012 at $338.07 million but 
has had a decline in recent years.  
 
Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget.  
Figure 9.  ICE Enacted Budget (in $Billions).166 
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Note: 2015 and 2016 numbers represent proposed budget, not enacted budget. 
Figure 10.  DHS Analysis and Operations Enacted Budget.167 
C. SIGNIFICANT CBP BORDER SECURITY INVESTMENTS 
The budgets of DHS demonstrate that there are significant investments made in 
securing America’s borders. DHS justifies each year to Congress the need for significant 
funding and does so through its Budget in Brief series. In order to understand the federal 
government’s justification for massive budgets, it is appropriate to review CBP’s 
significant border security investments. Securing the U.S.–Mexico border is a constantly 
evolving endeavor that requires CBP to adapt to new ways criminals transit the border. 
The reason for focusing specifically on CBP investments is because they are the agency 
that is primarily investing in protecting the U.S.–Mexico Border. 
In 2004, the DHS budget allocated over $18 billion dollars to border security and 
transportation security, including $273 million to improve infrastructure and 
technology.168 Funding was also provided to improve tracking of people entering and 
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leaving the country with over $100 million additional funding for America’s entry-exit 
initiative.169 The 2005 CBP budget specified continued investment of $64 million in its 
Remote Video System (RVS) to allow increased surveillance along the border.170 
Additional enhancements in targeting system programs warranted $20 million and would 
result in an increase in identification of “high-risk travelers and goods.”171 The requested 
$10 million dollars to procure and use UAVs would prove to become a useful tool in 
CBP’s arsenal for preventing illegal traffic.172 
The 2006 budget provided key funding to technologies on the air and ground. 
CBP allocated $44.2 million to take control of the Long-Range Radar technology used at 
the nation’s border by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).173 CBP allocated 
$125 million to acquire radiation portal monitors to detect and prevent WMD from 
entering the United States.174 The America’s Shield Initiative (ASI) received $51.1 
million, which “enhances electronic surveillance capability along the Northern and 
Southern land borders.”175 The US-VISIT program received $390 million for 
implementation at land POEs.176 This program is a “biometric storage and matching 
service,” that provides identifying information on people leaving a coming to the 
country.177 The Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI) received $1 million to continue 
providing an enhanced cooperative approach to border security between federal, state, 
and local law enforcement. An automated biometrics system that will help increase 
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detection rates of illegal travelers, named the Automated Biometric Identification System 
(IDENT)/Integrated Automated Fingerprint System (IAFIS), received $3 million in 
funding.178 
In 2007, the CBP budget allocated over $1.4 billion to a new project called the 
Secure Border Initiative (SBI). This included massive amounts of funding in 
infrastructure along the San Diego border ($30 million), Western Arizona border ($51 
million), the U.S. VISIT Program ($399.5 million), Border Patrol Staffing Initiation 
($647.8 million), and SBInet ($1 billion).179 The tactical infrastructure included lighting, 
vehicle barriers, fencing, and patrol roads to be put into place.180 The costliest investment 
is in a now cancelled program called SBInet. It will show in future budgets, but the 
program was ultimately found to be too costly and due to terrain problems failed to 
achieve the “one size fits all integrated fixed tower-based solution across the entire 
border.”181 DHS cancelled the program in 2011. 
The budget for 2008 expanded border control staffing an additional $647.8 
million.182 SBInet received funding of $1 billion. CBP allocated $100 million to improve 
and provide additional border security facilities due to the current ones being operating at 
its capacity.183 CBP assigned $25 million in funding for modernization to the Treasury 
Enforcement Communication System (TECS). This system allows for cross-agency 
watchlist checks at the border so no person entering through America’s borders would go 
unnoticed if restricted by an outside agency.184 During this FY, the CBP exceeded its 
                                                 
178 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2013, 86. 
179 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006): 8–9, 27–28, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Budget_BIB-FY2007.pdf. 
180 Ibid., 27. 
181 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report of the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative-
Network (SBInet) Program (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011): 1, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2011/sbi-net-assessment.pdf. 
182 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007): 29, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf. 
183 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008, 29. 
184 Ibid. 
 42 
goal of 145 miles of fencing at the border, a number that would be increased to over 670 
by the end of the year.185 
The 2009 budget allocated money to increase border staffing by over 2,200 
($362.5 million), improve Border Patrol Facilities ($149.5 million), increase Air and 
Marine Staffing ($4 million), and provide maintenance to the U.S.-Visit Program ($62.8 
million) among the items.186 The CBP Intelligence Program received its initial funding of 
$24 million to further develop the ability of the CBP to deter and detect illegal border 
security crossings.187 FY 2010 continued increases in staffing investment along with 
$26.1 million to combat Southbound Firearms and Currency Smuggling.188 This 
initiative was meant to increase staffing in between POEs along the Southwest border and 
increase the capabilities of its License Plate Reader (LPR) program, which helps identify 
suspicious vehicles quickly by querying the TECS database.189  
In 2011, CBP allocated $10 million to hire 103 intelligence analysts who will 
provide “information required to make tactically and strategically sound decisions while 
also ensuring cost-effectiveness.”190 DHS allocated $10 million to expand the BEST 
program in additional locations to “disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations posing 
significant threats to border security.”191 The SBInet program received decreases in 
funding this year prior to its cancellation at the beginning of the next fiscal year. 
With SBInet cancelled, in 2012 CBP redirected its attention to expand current 
technology that was successful along the U.S. border with $242 million. These funds 
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included the completion of 3 out of 5 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems in 
conjunction with other mobile equipment in Arizona.192 In 2013, CBP allocated an 
additional $91 million to add another IFT along with other technologies focused on the 
Arizona area.193 In FY 2012, $40 million was allocated to replace the current Tactical 
Communication (TACCOM) program with a more robust system along the Southwest 
border.194 CBP allocated $261.5 million to the US-VISIT program in FY 2013 in order to 
take control of the program from the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
(NPPD) in DHS.195 
In FY 2014, CBP took over control of the TARS program from the DOD and 
needed $37.4 million fund this venture. The IFS program received an allocation of $77.4 
million to continue its proven track record along the Arizona border.196 CBP allocated 
$40 million to update the TACCOM program with new digital technology with 
encryption capability to replace old analog radios.197 CBP reserved over $362 million for 
infrastructure and technology updates. This included $46 million for its Remote Video 
Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and $44 million for its Mobile Video Surveillance Systems 
(MVSS) upgrades and expansions.198 In 2015, an initial $13 million was allocated to 
develop the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), which would eliminate 
the 30 days to share information between federal agencies on who has violated 
immigration laws.199 Another new system that was assigned budgeting for 2015 was to 
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develop a National Border Geo-Spatial Intelligence Strategy and establish a Southwest 
Border Tracking system. The $11 million-dollar allocation would “allow CBP to 
establish a geospatial tracking system for use across the Southwest border that will record 
the location of all apprehensions, getaways, and turnbacks.”200  
In FY 2016, CBP allocated $373.5 million to maintain border infrastructure and 
technology.201 This included $44.7 million allocated to complete primary fencing along 
the Arizona border where criminals have been able to exploit weaknesses in border 
security.202 More than $70 million was allocated to aircraft replacement and increased 
flight hours along the border. $16 million was allocated to increase Mobile Surveillance 
Capability (MSC) and $25.020 million was allocated to the MVSS system.203 The 
intelligence operations received $12.9 million in funding along with the expansion of the 
National Geospatial Border Strategy that received $8.4 million in funding.204 
The investments in border security by DHS are substantial. Set aside DHS’ 
investment in SBInet, the most expensive item on its budget is its investment in human 
capital. The CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents are what make up the majority of its 
year to year costs. The review of significant border security investments in technology 
and infrastructure demonstrates the complexity of perceived required investments. There 
are constantly new approaches taken and new investments being made. The unanswered 
question is this: Are border security investments working? How is this measured and is 
DHS investing its money wisely? The next section will review perceived 
accomplishments by DHS in border security. 
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D. BORDER SECURITY ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
This massive amount of federal budgeting allocated to border security should 
yield impressive results. An examination of these accomplishments by DHS in regard to 
border security is necessary to help determine whether they are going along the correct 
path in investments in technology and infrastructure improvements. The part of DHS that 
is responsible for the majority of enforcement along the U.S.–Mexico border is CBP’s 
U.S. Border Patrol. This section will evaluate border security accomplishments by the 
USBP followed by border security accomplishments by the CBP since its inception. 
The U.S. Border Patrol’s apprehensions by year along the U.S.–Mexico border 
have steadily declined since the creation of the CBP, these numbers are shown in Figure 
11. The graphical representation of apprehensions along the border is directly inverse to 
the amount of staffing placed at the border shown in Figure 8. Apprehensions peaked in 
2005 at over one million and over the past year years have consistently stayed at 
approximately 400,000. There is a loose correlation between more border patrol agents 
resulting in fewer apprehensions at the border. This could suggest that the amount of 
border patrol agents assigned to the Southwest border are an appropriate deterrent to 
illegal crossings. The bit of evidence to refute the preceding statement is shown in Figure 
12, which demonstrates there is no correlation between border agents patrolling the 
border and the amount of deaths at the border. The amount of deaths does not seem to be 
decreasing and is variable by year, suggesting that people are still taking the same 
amount of risk to transit the border illegally, even though there is increased presence 
along the border.  
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Figure 11.  USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions.205  
 
Figure 12.  Southwest Border Deaths.206 
                                                 
205 Data from U.S. Border Patrol, “Southwest Border Sectors - Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by 
Fiscal Year,” date accessed February 10, 2017, 
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Beginning in 2011, the USBP began publishing threat sector data that specified 
enforcement numbers along the Southwest border for drugs, weapons, ammunition, and 
currency seizures. This enforcement data is available in Figures 13 through 16. The data 
is more limited in scope due to the recentness of publication; however, there appear to be 
downward trends in all enforcement categories except for currency seizures. The 
enforcement results cannot be attributed to border patrol agents’ presence at the border 
alone. It is appropriate to review CBP accomplishments as a whole to help decipher if 
there is any sort of trend between border security investments and accomplishments.  
 
Figure 13.  USBP Southwest Border Firearm Seizures.207 
                                                 




Figure 14.  USBP Southwest Border Ammunition (rounds) Seizures.208 
 
Figure 15.  USBP Southwest Border Currency Seizures.209 
                                                 





Figure 16.  USBP Southwest Border Drugs Seizures (Pounds) Seizures.210 
The CBP annually publishes its accomplishments for the year prior in DHS’ 
Budget in Brief series. The accomplishments in 2003 and 2004 were primarily focused on 
trade enforcement with little mention of border security. In 2005, the CBP and ICE 
implemented an “interior repatriation” program that repatriated 20,580 individuals into 
Mexico “away from border smuggling organizations.”211 They also credited the seizure 
of over “1.2 million pounds of narcotics between ports of entry” and seized over 416,500 
pounds by air.212 The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program received an additional 
23,000 enrollees, expediting travel across the southern border.213 
In 2006, the CBP’s Air and Marine contributed to the apprehension of 
approximately 205 thousand illegal aliens leading to over 925 arrests.214 The CBP’s Air 
and Marine seized over 1.4 million pounds of drugs between ports of entry.215 FY 2007 
                                                 
210 Data from U.S. Border Patrol, “Sector Profile - FY 2012–2016,” date accessed February 10, 2017, 
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214 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007, 26–27. 
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accomplishments included significant physical infrastructure at the border. In 2007, they 
added 76 miles of primary fencing to the border, bringing it to a total of 154.7 miles of 
primary fencing at the border.216 A 20 percent reduction in apprehensions occurred, 
including a 68 percent decrease in Arizona, that correlates with the ABCI initiative 
mentioned in the significant investment sections.217 The border patrol traffic checkpoints 
contributed to over 21 thousand apprehensions and 3,459 narcotic seizures.218 
In 2008, the CBP increased its “miles under effective control” from 599 to 757 
miles.219 This number rose to 939 miles in 2009.220 The CBP credited these 
accomplishments to a mix of intelligence and physical infrastructure at the border.221 In 
2008, fencing along the border was increased to 357.4 miles.222 There were in total over 
723,000 people apprehended between ports of entry.223 In 2009, there were 45,283 “other 
than Mexicans” apprehended at the Southwest border and a total of 556,000 people 
apprehended between ports of entry.224  
In 2010, the CBP “completed nine 45-day Alliance to Combat Transnational 
Threats operations along 80 miles of the Arizona/Sonora border . . . contributing to 
212,202 criminal arrests and seizure of 1,033,227 pounds of marijuana.”225 The CBP also 
for the first time screened 100% of rail bound shipments transiting the Southwest border 
and seized $104 million in illegal currency, which was $28 million more than the two 
years prior.226 CBP and Mexican authorities completed 22 joint operations and resulted 
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in $113,000 in currency and 23.75 kilograms of narcotics seized.227 In 2010, CBP seized 
a total of $56 million of illegal currency at the Southwest Border.228 
In 2011, UAVs began to conduct full border sweeps along the U.S.–Mexico 
border. This program assisted in the seizure of over 7,600 pounds of narcotics and the 
apprehension of 467 individuals.229 The UAVs contributed to over 59,000 pounds of 
narcotics seizures in 2013, a significant rise from two years earlier.230 The CBP 
mentioned no other significant accomplishments specific to the U.S.-Mexico border for 
FY 2014 and 2015 that have not been previously discussed. DHS did not provide CBP’s 
enforcement accomplishments for 2016 in the FY 2017 Budget-in-Brief. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an empirical look at the budgeting and enforcement data for 
DHS in regards to border security. There appears to be no direct correlation between 
investment in border security resulting operational control of the border. There is no 
explanation in the budgets or enforcement data produced by DHS that can directly state a 
particular technology or investment in human capital resulted in a certain level of 
enforcement. It is evident that progress has been made in border enforcement based on 
the data presented; however, it is clear an answer to achieve operational control has not 
been found.  
The constant investment in new technology and fluctuation in personnel 
demonstrates that more focus by DHS needs to be on efficiently using taxpayer money to 
achieve success at the border. Loosely correlating enforcement data to justify budgetary 
requests does not provide answers as to whether operational control is efficiently being 
strived for. The next chapter will outline what DHS should consider in developing a 
model for border control and provide a way forward for justification of U.S.-Mexico 
Border security expenditures. 
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IV. U.S.–MEXICO BORDER SECURITY DECISION MODEL  
A review of the command and control structure of border security, DHS’ assets, 
and its enforcement data pertaining to border security demonstrates complicated 
challenges in developing a model that captures an accurate quantitative assessment of 
return-on-investment. The standard risk reduction method discussed in the literary 
review, that has widely been adopted by DHS, is largely dependent upon subjective data 
to measure the effectiveness of an investment. Scholars have attempted to increase the 
accuracy of this model by creating more complicated and in-depth variations. Regardless 
of their methods, it still relies upon subjective input to assess investments based on 
shoddy empirical evidence to create inputted values to the formula. A more qualitative 
approach to modelling investment on border security is more appropriate.  
A model to account for return on border security investment will need to focus on 
a set of decisions that help determine whether an investment is warranted. This chapter 
will provide an outline on the proper series of decisions to account for border security 
investments. The decision process in this chapter will serve as a tool for the development 
of future models, whether they are qualitative or quantitative. 
A. STEP ONE: DETERMINE THE OBJECTIVE OF A BORDER SECURITY 
MEASURE 
The first consideration when choosing a border security expenditure is to 
determine the objective of the expenditure. According to the Secure Fence Act of 2006, 
DHS is to maintain operation control of the border.231 Operational control of the border is 
defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries 
by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other 
contraband.”232 The law orders the installation of fencing and surveillance at certain 
points of the U.S.–Mexico border, but does not directly state how DHS will obtain 
operational control of the border.  
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When considering an investment in a border security measure, DHS must 
consider whether or not the investment is able to achieve operational control of the 
border? Research into this topic for a security measure will need to be empirically studied 
and “red team” analysis will need to be implemented and tested. If a measure has been 
used before on the U.S.–Mexico border or another country’s border, policy makers can 
use empirical data to determine whether or not it can help achieve operational control. If 
an investment is a new security measure that has not been used before, independent 
analysis must take place that measures how difficult it is for an adversary to defeat the 
measure given the normal expected capability of that adversary. Initial analysis must 
answer whether the investment can help achieve operational control or not? If the answer 
is yes or possibly yes, DHS should include the security measure in the next step of the 
process. If the answer is no, DHS should discard the security measure. 
B. STEP TWO: LIST ALL POSSIBLE BORDER SECURITY MEASURES 
THAT WILL HELP ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
The next step is to list all possible investments that could achieve operational 
control. It is understood for this model that DHS will need a combinations of security 
measures to achieve operational control. DHS has not been able to achieve operational 
control of the border; further, it is clear from reviewing the existing combination of 
border security measures that DHS will not achieve operational control by any single 
security measure. Currently, there are fencing, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, 
mobile surveillance, border patrol surveillance and enforcement, bilateral collaboration 
and intelligence operations among other assets securing the border. These combination of 
security measures are trying to prevent drugs, weapons, ammunition, illegal currency, 
and personnel from illegally transiting the border. To assume any one investment will be 
able to effectively prevent all illegal transition of the border would be ambitious.  
Listing possible security measures enables DHS to understand all options 
available for enhancing border security. My model will organize security measures into 
four separate lists. The first list includes security measures that can achieve operational 
control of the entire 1,954 mile U.S.–Mexico Border. By examining security measures 
that will help achieve operational control of the entire border, policy makers will 
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understand what options they have that can cover large areas. This list is important to 
have because these measures will need to be combined with security measures that have a 
more minute focus. 
The second list is security measures that would achieve operational control sorted 
by the separate border control sectors that lie along the U.S.–Mexico border. These 
sectors include the San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, Del Rio, 
Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Sectors. Each sector faces specific challenges that would 
warrant more or less of a securitized environment. Areas of the border that are seldom 
traversed illegally would not warrant as stringent of security measures as areas that are 
empirically known to foster large amounts of illegal traffic. Listing security measures that 
could cover the entire border and cross-referencing them with potential combinations that 
are sector focused will help policy makers choose the correct combination of resources to 
use. 
The third security measure list organizes investments by terrain type. Specific 
security measures will be more or less effective depending on the type of terrain they are 
meant to secure. For example, mobile surveillance towers are much less effective in 
mountainous terrain than they would be in a flat surface environment. The list would sort 
security measures based on mountainous terrain, flat terrain, valleys, and waterways. 
Policy makers can use this list in combination with the border sector divided list to help 
policy makers choose the correct combination of security measures that will suit the 
specific terrain needs based on the threat environment. 
The fourth security measure list will include security measures that involve 
bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico. Mexico is the second largest 
export market and third largest overall trading partner for the United States.233 Border 
security cannot be a unilateral process that results in a diminished relationship between 
the two nations because the two nations are linked so closely economically as well as 
culturally. Factoring in bilateral enforcement measures that contribute to operational 
                                                 
233 M. Angeles Villareal, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications (CRS 
Report No. RL32934) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf.  
 56 
control of the border will allow the U.S. policy makers to strengthen the border while 
simultaneously prevent confrontation along the border. 
Providing all available options that will assist in operational control of the border 
is important in choosing which combination would be most effective. This list should not 
only consider currently available technology. Policy makers should assign grants to 
defense companies to research new technologies and assets that will assist in operational 
control. Policy makers need to consider future technologies and hard security measures 
because up until this point DHS has not achieved operational control and no concrete 
solution has been found. To choose a combination of security measures that precludes 
potential future security measures may result in ignoring the most cost-effective approach 
to securing operational control of the U.S.–Mexico border. 
Technological and physical assets placed at the U.S.–Mexico border will not be 
the only measures that can contribute to operational control of the border. Internal 
immigration enforcement, drug awareness and rehabilitation programs, internal 
enforcement on fake currency, and illegal weapons trade enforcement can all contribute 
to eliminating the demand markets for these illegal activities that transit the border. There 
are a multitude of incentives that dominate the rational for people to illegally enter the 
United States. Heightened illegal immigration enforcement would make the incentive to 
transit the border more expensive and could reduce the attractiveness of this risky 
venture. Reducing the American market for illegal drugs will reduce the demand for the 
illegal transiting of the border. The list of programs requires consideration because they 
address the source of the issues that monetarily make illegal activity at the border 
appetizing. 
C. STEP THREE: EVALUATE COSTS OF SECURITY MEASURES 
Once the lists have been categorically organized, policymakers must assign costs 
to each technological asset, physical asset, and program that will assist in developing 
operational control of the border. The valuation of these assets must include setup costs, 
operational costs, and maintenance costs. To have a comparable baseline for each asset, 
its value needs to be demonstrated as its net present value.  
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The lists must include all assets, even if they are too expensive. The 
Congressional approved DHS budget has its limitations. As seen in the previous chapter, 
the budget for DHS in 2016 was approximately $52 billion, with only $373 million 
allocated toward border security fencing, infrastructure, and technology. President 
Trump’s proposed 2018 budget is calling for $1.6 billion attributed to building a border 
wall with brick and mortar.234 The purpose of including security measures that may be 
out of reach is to demonstrate the total investment DHS assesses it needs to achieve 
operational control of the border. Listing costs will lead to demonstrating what assessed 
level of enforcement will be able to be achieved at the current budget level compared to 
an unlimited budget. 
D. STEP FOUR: EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY 
MEASURES 
The most important step for determining the correct combination of assets that 
will provide operational control of the border is one that accurately measures 
effectiveness. The definition of effectiveness for this model is the “assurance the 
security-enforcing mechanism of the system meet the stated security objectives.”235 The 
objective is operational control of the border, which is defined by the Secure Fence Act 
of 2006. DHS will need to create a new metric that applies quantitative value to 
qualitative measurement parameters.  
The risked-based model that DHS employs is insufficient for this step of the 
model. The current risk-based model employed by DHS does not account for a 
combination of assets in reducing risk of an attack. It also assumes there is an accepted 
level of vulnerability. A risk-based model demonstrates subjectively which security 
measure will reduce the likelihood of attack more and ignores the stated objective of 
DHS for border security, which is complete operational control. DHS must create a new 
model. 
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A new type of model for measuring effectiveness will also require subjective 
input. It is impossible to objectively quantify the overall effects of a security measure. 
The risk-based model is subjectively determined but that is not its main shortfall. DHS 
uses the model to achieve the incorrect goal of border security. They use the risk-based 
model to compare cost-effectiveness of assets, not for determining operational control. I 
am proposing DHS must research and employ a different model that correctly measures 
its ability to achieve effective operational control of the border. 
In order for DHS’ new model to fit into my decision process, quantitative 
measures for effectiveness need to be on a scale from 0 to 1. The lowest end of 
effectiveness, 0, would mean the security measure provides no operational control of the 
border. The high end of effectiveness, 1, would mean the security measure provides 
complete operational control. The model must reflect partial operational control by an 
asset in fractions between 0 and 1. The effectiveness model must account for the 
combination of assets resulting in a higher amount of operational control for each 
individual asset.  
The effectiveness model must consider opportunity costs in its calculations. 
Opportunity costs will reduce a security measure’s overall effectiveness. Border security 
measures that ruin the bilateral economic relationship between the United States and 
Mexico should carry a lower effectiveness compared to a security measure that do not. In 
addition, a security measure that is damaging to the environment should be considered 
less effective to one that results in minimal environmental impact. Security measures that 
negatively disrupt the well-being of Americans, which includes cultural and economic 
ties with Mexico, will not be tolerated in a democracy. The inclusion of opportunity costs 
on effectiveness is important in determining a politically feasible combination of assets to 
protect the border.  
The scale of effectiveness for each asset will vary by list. The effectiveness 
measurement must be calculated on how effective a specific measure is for that assigned 
list. For example, the effectiveness of a wall that would encompass the whole border 
needs to be evaluated based on its ability to provide operational control of the entire 
border. The scale for an effectiveness measurement for Integrated Fixed Towers (IFTs) 
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along the Tucson sector must be limited to that sector. The sector, terrain, and program 
security measures must have a conversion factor that allows their effectiveness to be 
integrated with border wide investments. After each asset has a quantifiable rating, it will 
be possible to propose the correct combination of assets to achieve operational control of 
the border. 
E. CHOOSING A COMBINATION OF SECURITY MEASURES 
Successful completion of each step of this model will allow the policymakers at 
DHS to pick the correct combination of security measures that will result in operational 
control of the border. At this point, the five lists provide possible security measures to 
achieve operational control of the U.S.–Mexico border. The user has calculated present 
value in dollars for each potential investment. Finally, the user has an effectiveness to 
consider for each security measures. Operational control of the border can be achieved by 
combining assets to equal a value at or near 1. Figure 17 is an example of the model. 
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Figure 17.  Decision Model for Operational Control of the U.S.–Mexico Border. 
F. LIMITATIONS TO THE DECISION MODEL 
This proposed decision model specifically focuses on operational control of the 
border, which limits valuing impact of security measures specifically on their ability to 
prevent illegal transition of the border. Border security measures have impacts on society 
outside the realm the realm of operational control. The effectiveness model discussed 
should include opportunity costs of a security measure; however, opportunity costs of a 
specific measure will not include a multitude of peripheral effects on society. 
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The prevention of illegal migration can have economic effects on both sides of the 
border. Illegal migration is a result of push factors for Mexico and pull factors from the 
United States.236 The higher wages offered in the United States have facilitated a market 
for smugglers from Mexico.237 When security measures increase, there is evidence that 
Mexican worker wages in border towns are reduced.238 Conversely, the reduction of the 
illegal labor market in the United States would result in higher costs for business. This 
model does not consider these effects because the supply of an illegal workforce is not a 
part of legitimate legal trade. 
This model does not account for what to do about operational control of the 
border resulting in increased stay-time of illegal migrants. A security measure resulting in 
longer stay times, thus a larger illegal population, should not be considered in the 
effectiveness measurement. Deportation enforcement is a separate policy issue from 
operational control of the border. While higher deportation enforcement may have an 
effect on migration flows across the border, what to do about the populations after 
effective control of the border is achieved is a separate issue. U.S. policy makers will 
have to create deportation policy that is multilaterally supported to deal with the 
increased illegal population.  
This model does not address the potential “balloon effect” of the drug market if 
operational control of the border is achieved. This effect implies that if you cut a supply 
route in one area, another one will be created.239 This model focuses on prevention of 
illegal drug migration across the border, it ignores supply routes being created in areas 
other than the U.S.–Mexico border. Citizens may choose to migrate south for their supply 
of drugs. These issues should not be considered in this model. 
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The decision model in isolation focuses solely on ways to prevent illegal 
transition of the border. Policy makers need to consider the peripheral effects but it will 
require additional analysis outside of this model to deal with the multitude of situations 
that will arise as a result of implemented border security measures. Bilateral relations 
with Mexico and multilateral relations with other Central and South American countries 
will be important for dealing with the multitude of effects that result from achieving 
operational control of the border. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of using this decision process for security measures will demonstrate 
three things to Congress. First, the decision process demonstrates the required dollar 
needed achieve operational control of the border. It is safe to say that this amount will be 
outside of the current allocated budget for DHS, because they have yet to achieve 
operational control at the current budgeting level. Secondly, it will show members of 
Congress how effective DHS can be at the current budgeting level. Using this process, a 
combination of assets can be chosen that most effectively achieve operational control of 
the border, yet it will demonstrate what shortfalls exist and where. Thirdly, efficient 
spending will be a result of this method of decision making because costs will be directly 
considered when limiting assets to fit within a given budget. Policy makers can compare 




V. DHS, U.S.–MEXICO BORDER, AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
DHS is a relatively new federal organization and coordinating the function of 22 
federal agencies is a complicated task. Establishing effective relationships with state and 
local authorities is also complicated considering each law enforcement agency may 
operate slightly differently. DHS’ inability to achieve operational control of the border to 
date is not surprising. This thesis has demonstrated that there are multiple threats faced at 
the border and each threat has its own independent variables to consider when choosing 
the proper security measures. This thesis has also demonstrated that the current border 
security measures have not gotten DHS any closer to achieving cost-effective operational 
control of the border.  
There are multiple questions in the road ahead for DHS. Will it ever achieve 
operational control of the border? Will it produce a standard of effectiveness for security 
measures that can justify its costs? Will policies in the government continue to support its 
mission in achieving operational control? With an uncertain future ahead for the Federal 
agency, this chapter will outline the proposed border wall by President Trump, discuss 
the effects of interior enforcement on border issues under President Trump, and conclude 
with the importance of achieving a cost-effective operational control of the border. 
A. U.S.–MEXICO BORDER WALL 
President Trump promised throughout his 2016 Presidential campaign that he 
would build a wall that spans the entire U.S.–Mexico border. He signed an Executive 
Order titled, “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” that 
directed DHS to immediately begin construction of a wall along the southern border.240 
CBP has requested designs and bids from companies for the construction of the wall. The 
requested characteristics include:  
“Imposing in height,” which the agency defined as at least 18 feet but 
ideally about 30 feet tall, and extending 6 feet underground to discourage 
tunneling. With features on top to make it impossible to jump over using 
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ladders, hooks or other climbing aids. And, heeding Trump’s desire for a 
“beautiful” wall, that the north, U.S.-facing side be “aesthetically 
pleasing” and consistent with the surrounding area.241 
At the time of this writing, it is unclear where funding for the border wall will come 
from. An internal DHS report estimated the cost of the wall to be $21.6 billion and will 
take three and a half years to complete.242 
The construction of a wall along the southern border will be a deterrent to illegal 
immigration and make it more difficult to traverse the border with illegal drugs, weapons, 
and currency. Whether or not this will lead DHS toward the path of achieving operational 
control of the border is debatable. The demand markets will still exist for drugs, currency, 
weaponry, and an illegal workforce. A wall will not singularly eliminate the market for 
illegal goods and services. If built, the wall will need to be combined with other security 
measures to help DHS achieve operational control.  
B. INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT 
President Trump’s tough approach to immigration enforcement has had effects on 
illegal immigration. In Executive Order 13766, the President ordered DHS to detain and 
expedite deportation of illegal aliens who have violated local or federal law.243 Secretary 
of Homeland Security John Kelly credited President Trump’s harsh stance on illegal 
immigration for the severe decline in border arrests. In March 2017, apprehensions at the 
border was the lowest it has been in 17 years.244 In the same month, seizures of cash 
heading south of the border are up 48 percent compared to March 2016, $18.6 million 
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compared to $12.6 million.245 The President has vowed to hire an additional 15,000 
federal agents for border and interior enforcement.246 
It is too early to determine the impact of President Trump’s border security focus. 
The President has not had a fiscal year cycle in which his proposed budget has been 
enacted to physically alter enforcement at the border or within the country. The President 
is merely allowing DHS to act upon laws and funding that were already in place prior to 
his presidency. Going forward, it is unclear how his emphasis on border security 
enforcement will potentially impact the drug trade, weapons trade, and the movement of 
illegal currency. 
C. LOOKING AHEAD AT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF U.S.–MEXICO 
BORDER 
The ability for DHS to achieve cost-effective operational control of the border 
depends on cross-departmental cooperation among federal agencies. Multilateral 
cooperation in the levels of government is also required. The proposal of the wall for the 
U.S.–Mexico border has been done with minimal focus on efficiency. The wall cannot be 
depended on to achieve operational control of the border without including other assets. 
DHS must employ a model that accounts for cooperation among security assets 
and policies in determining cost-effectiveness in achieving operational control of the 
border. The model proposed in the preceding chapter outlines a decision process that will 
help DHS consider how to achieve operational control of the border. As of this writing 
the national debt is over $19 trillion dollars.247 DHS needs to terminate the trial and error 
process of determining border security investments. The security of American citizens is 
important, but using taxpayer money efficiently is more pertinent. 
The trial and error method to budgeting for border security has led to billions of 
dollars in wasted investments. An example of this is the SBInet program. DHS Budget 
                                                 
245 Ron Nixon and Fernando Santos, “U.S. Appetite for Mexico’s Drugs Fuels Illegal Immigration,” 
New York Times, April 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/us/politics/us-appetite-for-mexicos-
drugs-fuels-illegal-immigration.html?_r=0. 
246 Ibid. 
247 “U.S. Debt Clock.org,” U.S. Debt Clock.org, accessed May 27, 2017, http://www.usdebtclock.org/. 
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requests from 2008–2011 included requests for over $3 billion for the deserted SBInet 
program.248 DHS failed to incorporate logical long-term analysis of SBInet prior to its 
inception. The program was supposed to create a technological integration that would 
help strengthen border security between ports of entry.249 DHS’ claim that the SBInet 
program would help achieve effective control of the border was never evaluated on how 
well it would work. The primary CBP performance measure for SBInet was “percent of 
border miles covered by SBInet technology – southwest border.”250 After years of cost-
overruns, delays in implementation, inability of the program to adjust to different terrain 
types, and the availability of cheaper alternatives, DHS discontinued the project in 
2011.251 
DHS used Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to “assess the cost effectiveness of 
SBInet.”252 AoA is the “evaluation of different choices available for achieving an 
objective, usually requiring cost-benefit analysis, life cycle costing, and sensitivity 
analysis.”253 DHS compared SBInet with four alternative technology categories: Agent-
Centric, Fixed, Mobile, and Aviation-Centric.254 DHS used four metrics to evaluate 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) of alternative investments. The categories included: 
monitoring and persistent surveillance, enable timely and effective response, and two 
other categories that focused on “other considerations (for example, agent safety) and the 
ability to adapt to shifts in traffic and threats at the border.”255 DHS concluded that 
                                                 
248 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief Fiscal Year 2008–2011. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003–2016. https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget#. 
249 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Defense, SBInet Program: 
Program Specific Recovery Act Plan, May 15, 2009, 2, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/recovery/CBP_SBInet_Program_Final_2009-05-15.pdf. 
250 Ibid., 9. 
251 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report of the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative, 
5–6. 
252 Ibid., 7. 
253 Business Dictionary, s.v. “Analysis of alternatives (AOA),” accessed July 24, 2017, 
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255 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report of the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative, 
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different variants of security measures are required for different parts of the border and 
the “one size fits all” method to enforcement that SBInet employs does not work.256 It 
took DHS multiple years and billions of dollars in investment to come to this conclusion. 
DHS never established a proper goal for the program nor did it conduct enough research 
on its potential usefulness. If DHS used a decision model that incorporated proper 
assessment of SBInet’s effectiveness on different types of terrain and its ability to be 
incorporated with existing technologies prior to its implementation, federal money and 
time could have been saved.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis outlined the current literature available on valuing public expenditures, 
provided an organizational overview of DHS’ border security structure, reviewed DHS’ 
U.S.–Mexico Border Security expenditures and enforcement data, and provided a 
decision model for achieving operational control of the border. The expenditures for 
border security have proven to be significant and difficult to correlate to enforcement 
data. The United States has a long road ahead before being able to confidently declare 
operational control of the border. This declaration may never come. Operational control 
of the border begins with DHS constructing and implementing a proper model that will 
achieve this. 
The proper securitization of the border will involve agencies outside of DHS. The 
fact that DHS is the primary agency tasked with securing the border means it has the 
responsibility to determine a proper model. A proper model may result in funding being 
re-routed to programs that lay outside of its purview. DHS may be hesitant to admit 
funding should be routed somewhere else, but it will take a mature agency to be able to 
make this determination. DHS appears to be far from achieving operational control and 
this will continue until it can implement a proper model that justifies border security 
expenditures.  
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